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ABSTRACT
We consider the effect of excluding government investment from the deficit subject to the limits of
the European Stability and Growth Pact. In the model we consider, residents of a given country discount
future costs and benefits of government spending more than efficiency would dictate, because they
fail to take into account the portion that will accrue to people that have not yet been born or immigrated
into the country. It is thus in principle desirable to design budget rules that favor long-term investment
(by allowing more borrowing) over other government spending that only carries short-term benefits.
However, given the low rates of population growth, mortality, and mobility across European countries,
we find that the distortions arising from treating all government spending equally are likely to be modest.
We also show that these modest distortions can be alleviated only if net government investment is
excluded from the deficit computation; excluding gross investment may even be counterproductive,
as it promotes overspending in government capital.
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The European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is one of the most controversial pieces of the
institutional reforms that led to the European Monetary Union. The pact stems from the concern
that ﬁscal proﬂigacy in some of the member countries would adversely aﬀect all the others by
undermining the independence of the European Central Bank or by generating instability in the
Eurobond market at large. The SGP was adopted in 1997 to strengthen the provisions of the
Maastricht treaty, and to ensure that the ﬁscal discipline required for entering into the European
Currency Union would have to be maintained even after the adoption of the new currency.
The key provision of the SGP is a cap of 3 percent on the general government deﬁcit to GDP
ratio that each country is allowed to run in any given year. In its original form, the Pact set the
cap to be independent of the mix of government spending (whether transfers, recurrent expenses,
investment, or interest payments), and allowed for exceptions only in case of an unusual event
outside of the state’s control, or a severe recession.1 From the outset, many criticized the SGP as
imposing a straightjacket on ﬁscal authorities. In this article, we address a speciﬁc criticism: the
argument in favor of special treatment for public investment (see e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi [7],
Buiter [8], and Monti [18]). The argument starts from the premise that the ﬁscal authorities have
a bias toward projects that yield immediate gains and postpone the costs. Therefore, applying
the 3 percent cap to both investment and other expenses would lead governments to neglect
their historical role as providers of major infrastructure (such as roads, airports, and schools) in
favor of spending that yields more immediate but less long-lasting beneﬁts (for example, social
insurance or crime prevention). According to this view, appropriate incentives could be restored
if some of the costs of public investment were postponed as well. This would require more
borrowing to pay for public investment than to pay for other expenses.
The notion that public investment ought to be treated diﬀerently from other government
expenses is far from new. In fact, the prescription that the government should only be allowed to
borrow to pay for public investment is known in public ﬁnance as the “golden rule.” Many national
governments adopted this rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (see, for example, the
1The pact deﬁnes an economic downturn as severe if there is an annual fall of real GDP of at least 2 percent.
1quotations in Bassetto with Sargent [4]),2 but the rule fell out of favor at the national level
in the twentieth century, and very few countries adopt it nowadays (Germany being a notable
exception). By contrast, this rule approximates well the behavior of most U.S. states: almost all
of the states’ constitutions provide for very strict borrowing limits, but many allow signiﬁcant
borrowing for public investment (National Association of State Budget Oﬃcers [19]).
In recent years, many countries have struggled to meet the strict deﬁcit cap imposed by the
SGP. When the core countries of France and Germany failed to meet it in 2002, 2003, and 2004,
it became clear that the pact was unenforceable, at least in its original form. The pact was
reformed in 2005.3 This reform explicitly acknowledged the role of public investment as well as
“policies to foster research and development and innovation” (European Council on the Stability
and Growth Pact, [14], article 1). Such expenses are cited as one of the factors that should be
taken into account in evaluating whether a deﬁcit is truly excessive.
In this article, we analyze one rationale for the adoption of the golden rule: the conﬂict
that arises among diﬀerent generations when the current government policy has the potential
to provide both beneﬁts (through investment) and costs (through borrowing) to future, unborn
cohorts. Given the low rates of population growth, mobility, and mortality in European countries,
we ﬁnd that including or excluding public investment from the computation of the deﬁcit ceiling
has only moderate implications for the allocation chosen by current generations. We also ﬁnd
that the distinction between excluding gross or net investment from the computation of the
deﬁcit is relevant.
In section 2 we describe the model we use to analyze eﬃciency of the government spending
mix. This model is based upon a paper by Bassetto with Sargent [5] that analyzed the same
issue in the context of the U.S. federal and state governments. In section 3 we discuss the data
that we use to calibrate the key parameters of the model, with particular attention to mobility.
2Most of the early provisions distinguished between “extraordinary” and “ordinary” expenses, rather than
between public improvements and other expenses. This distinction is relevant, since the largest extraordinary
expenses were wars, rather than major infrastructures.
3These reforms are widely considered to have signiﬁcantly watered down the pact (see, for example, Calm-
fors [9]), by giving leeway to postpone sanctions under a wide array of attenuating circumstances.
2In section 4 we present our main results and contrast the cases of the European countries with
the ﬁndings in Bassetto with Sargent [5] for the U.S. federal and state governments. Section 5
concludes.
2M o d e l
We describe here the salient features of the model, referring to Bassetto with Sargent [5] for a
complete description.
We consider a country populated by a large number of people of diﬀerent ages. For simplicity,
we abstract from the eﬀects of demographic change, and we assume that the demographics of
each country are in a steady state, characterized by a growth rate of the population n and a
given distribution of the population by age.4
Each person can live at most N + 1 periods (years). Conditional on having survived until
then, each household faces a probability 1 − θs of death in its sth period of life.
People consume a private good and enjoy the services of two public goods, one nondurable
(“government consumption”), the other durable (“government capital”). By their nature, the
same amounts of public goods are available to everyone, and nobody can be excluded from these
services; hence, these goods cannot be paid by user fees, but must instead be produced using tax
revenues.











where β is a discount factor,
s−t−1
j=0 θj is the probability of survival until age s − t, cs−t,s is
consumption of the private good in period s by a person age s − t (born in period t), f and v
are strictly concave utility functions, Γs is the per capita stock of public capital in period s,a n d
Gs is the amount of public consumption per capita in period s.
4The model could be solved by taking into account demographic changes as well, but the results would not be
aﬀected signiﬁcantly.





3Our analysis is greatly simpliﬁed by assuming that utility is linear in private consumption.
This implies that a person’s wealth will not aﬀect that individual’s relative preferences for private
versus public consumption and allows us to focus on diﬀerences in the survival probabilities as
the sole source of political conﬂict. This assumption is a useful approximation here because
we are particularly interested in the decision of public consumption versus public investment,a
margin that is less directly aﬀected by diﬀerences in wealth.6
In each period, each person alive produces y units of output, which can be either consumed as
a private good or turned into government consumption or investment.7 Public capital depreciates
at a rate δ. The economy-wide resource constraint is thus
Ct + Gt + γt ≤ y, (1)
where Ct is private consumption per capita and γt is government gross investment per capita in
period t.8
The country has a government that is empowered to levy taxes and produce public goods.
Taxes and spending are chosen by majority vote each period, subject to exogenous restrictions
on government indebtedness that are described by two parameters:
• d, a deﬁcit ceiling (expressed in per-capita terms); and
• x, a fraction of public investment that is not counted for the purposes of the deﬁcit ceiling.
The government budget constraint in period t can thus be written as







≤ d + xγt, (3)
where Bt is government debt per capita at the end of period t, Tt are taxes per capita in period
t,a n dr is the interest rate.9
6Simulations with more general preferences are discussed in the appendix of Bassetto with Sargent [5].
7Private capital and a more complete description of production could be introduced with no eﬀect on the
results.
8We thus have γt =Γ t − (1 − δ)Γt−1/(1 + n).
9In equilibrium, if a market for annuities exists, as we assume, r =( 1− β)/β.
4In the original version of the SGP, d was equal to 3 percent of GDP (y) and public investment
was not excluded, so x = 0. While the 2005 reform does not explicitly exclude public investment,
it does mention it as one of the factors that should be taken into account in assessing any breach
of the 3 percent ceiling, suggesting that x>0 (if not equal to 1) under the current interpretation.
Equation (3) assumes that the investment that can be excluded from the deﬁcit computation
is gross of capital depreciation. Blanchard and Giavazzi [7], among others, recommend excluding
net investment. In our numerical results, we establish that this is an important distinction. We












We assume that the government ﬁnances its operations through lump-sum taxes levied equally
on each person alive. We thus abstract from the distortionary eﬀects of taxation analyzed by
Barro [3] and Lucas and Stokey [16], among many others.
In each period, we assume that the households alive choose the level of public consumption,
public investment, and taxes, subject to the deﬁcit ceiling. In all of the numerical simulations that
follow, the generations alive will unanimously support running the maximum allowable deﬁcit,
since this will shift the burden of taxation to future generations. This means that eﬀectively the
generations alive will vote over public consumption and investment, with the understanding that
taxes will be set so as to hit the deﬁcit ceiling exactly in each period. The actual experience
of euro countries suggests that this result is less far-fetched than one would expect, since many
of them have consistently stayed very close to the upper limit throughout the existence of the
pact.10 If tax distortions were explicitly accounted for, countries would have an incentive to stay
away from the ceiling in favorable periods, but this would not aﬀect the main economic forces
analyzed here.
10In principle, the SGP provides that countries should strive for a budget “close to balance or in surplus” over
the medium term. ([13], art. 3). However, this provision is eﬀectively not enforced.
52.1 Some general intuition
A formal deﬁnition of an equilibrium is contained in the appendix. We discuss here the salient
features of the equilibrium.
The environment described in the previous section delivers a particularly simple notion of
the eﬃcient size of the government, since all households alive share a common valuation of the
public good.
An eﬃcient allocation of public goods (G∗,Γ∗) is given by the solution to the following two
equations:11
f
 (Gt)=1 , (4)
v
 (Γt)=1− β(1 − δ). (5)
Consider (4) ﬁrst. We chose units so that producing one unit of public consumption per capita
requires sacriﬁcing one unit per capita of the private good (see equation (1)). The utility cost
of the sacriﬁce is constant and equal to 1. Equation (4) states that, in an eﬃcient allocation,
government spending should be set so that the beneﬁt of an additional unit of public consumption
i se q u a lt oi t sc o s t .
In the case of government investment, the cost of an extra unit in terms of foregone private
consumption is again 1. The beneﬁt is now twofold. First, the additional government capital
yields immediate beneﬁts, captured by v (Γt). Second, government capital is durable, and 1 − δ
units will survive into the next period; these units can be used to save on next year’s investment,
thereby yielding a utility gain 1−δ tomorrow. These gains are discounted at the market discount
factor, which in equilibrium is β =1 /(1 + r).
Throughout this article, the equilibrium features unanimous support for the eﬃcient provision
of government consumption; that is, equation (4) will always hold. This happens because all
generations alive agree on the beneﬁts of this spending and they also equally share the costs.
Furthermore, since there is unanimous agreement for setting taxes so that the deﬁcit constraint
d is binding, independent of the level of spending, extra spending must be matched by extra
tax revenues to keep the deﬁcit at d, and no costs can be passed to future generations (at the
11For a formal derivation, see Bassetto with Sargent [5].
6margin). The goal of this article is to discuss whether government consumption and government
investment should be treated diﬀerently in the design of constitutional deﬁcit restrictions. For
this reason, we rely on an environment that abstracts from all the potential distortions that could
in practice lead to ineﬃciency in static decisions (such as the provision of public consumption),
and we concentrate instead on the conﬂict among diﬀerent generations that arises when the
government is called upon to make choices that have dynamic implications.
To further illustrate the conﬂict among people of diﬀerent ages over the provision of public
investment, consider the simple case in which government investment cannot be excluded from
the computation of the deﬁcit, so that x = 0. In this case, an extra unit of public investment
generates in equilibrium the following costs and beneﬁts:
1. The utility from consuming public capital increases in period t by v (Γt);
2. To pay for the investment, taxes increase in period t by 1; and
3. In period t+1, an additional (1−δ)/(1+n) units of capital per capita are available: this
is smaller than 1 both because capital depreciates and because the same capital is spread
over a larger population. The political equilibrium is such that investment will decrease
exactly by (1 − δ)/(1 + n), so taxes decrease by this amount as well.12
While the ﬁrst two eﬀects accrue to all generations alive equally, the last one will depend on the
probability of being alive and present in the same country in period t+1. A person of age s will





β(1 − δ). (6)
Comparing (5) and (6), we see that they coincide in the special case in which people are inﬁnitely
lived, immobile, and there is no population growth. These conditions lead to what is known more
generally as Ricardian equivalence – the principle of irrelevance of the debt and deﬁcit policy.13
12For a proof, see Bassetto with Sargent [5].
13Barro [2] explains that the result survives if people are part of dynasties where diﬀerent generations are con-
nected by altruism and intergenerational transfers. We assume this is not the case, although in our environment,
international mobility would generate a separate channel that breaks down Ricardian equivalence.
7In this case, borrowing shifts costs into the future, but the same people will be alive and paying
taxes into the future; thus, sooner or later, they will have to pay for the government spending.
Since it will always be the same people that beneﬁt from the public investment and pay the taxes,
and those people agree in each period on costs and beneﬁts, the case of Ricardian equivalence
yields the eﬃcient level of investment, independent of x.
In general, we see that x = 0 always leads people to favor underinvestment.14 The magnitude
of the underinvestment is related to three factors:15
• Population growth. The more new people are born (or immigrate), the more it is possible
to shift costs to them by borrowing. This eﬀect leads (alive) cohorts of all ages to discount
future beneﬁts excessively.
• Survival probabilities. The smaller the probability of surviving, the more people discount
future beneﬁts. Since the probability of dying in a given year is very small at most ages,
this channel will not be as important, except for the very old.
• Mobility. When people move from one country to another, they leave behind that country’s
public capital. At the same time, they stop paying that country’s taxes16 and thus leave
behind debt as well. For the purpose of the model, moving to a diﬀerent country is identical
to dying in the ﬁrst country and being “reborn” (at an age greater than 0) in the new one.
Since the young are more mobile than the middle-aged and the old, mobility will lead
the young to discount future beneﬁts and costs relatively more. As a consequence, when
x = 0, the voting pattern will usually pit the relatively impatient young and old against
14This is true as long as the population is not shrinking.
15As pointed out by Weil [24], the main driver behind all three factors is the inﬂux of new people into the
economy. As an example, for a given level of population growth, higher mortality also implies that more people
must either be born or immigrate. Nonetheless, distinguishing between the inﬂux of people and mortality/mobility
is important when considering the conﬂict among diﬀerent cohorts that are alive at the same time: the old will
discount future beneﬁts much more heavily than the young because they have a lower probability of survival.
16Even in countries that tax their citizens on income earned worldwide regardless of residence (for example,
the United States) a credit for taxes paid to foreign governments is allowed, so that in many instances no tax is
due.
8the relatively patient middle-aged.
When some borrowing for public investment is allowed (x>0), current investment may bear
consequences for more than two periods, and the preferences of each cohort depend on its entire
prospects for mobility and survival over the longer period. In principle, this could generate very
complicated patterns of voting by age. In practice, the simple intuition of the case with x =0
carries over to the speciﬁc parameters of our numerical simulations.
The big countries of the eurozone are characterized by very low population growth and low
(international) mobility. These factors suggest that their demographics will be close to Ricardian
equivalence; therefore, according a special treatment to government investment in the SGP is
unlikely to generate large eﬃciency gains, as our numerical analysis conﬁrms.
Our previous discussion focused entirely on the parameter x, which measures the amount of
public investment that is not counted in the computation of the deﬁcit subject to the ceiling.
The budget rule (3) contains a second parameter, d, the maximal deﬁcit level allowed. As it
turns out, the deﬁcit level has no eﬀect on government eﬃciency in our model economy. The
intuition for this result is straightforward. We already observed that current generations will set
t a x e ss oa st oh i td exactly. Combining equations (2) and (3) we get
Tt = Gt + r
Bt−1
1+n
+( 1− x)γt − d. (7)
Raising the ceiling is equivalent to a pure transfer of resources from future generations to the
current ones: it allows current generations to cut their tax payments, leaving more debt to be
repaid in the future. However, this does not aﬀect the trade-oﬀs that current generations face
at the margin. As an example, consider the trade-oﬀ between taxes and public consumption.
While the current generations can now aﬀord smaller taxes or higher public consumption, even
under the new ceiling they still need to trade oﬀ one fewer dollar of taxes for one more dollar
spent on the public good. This will lead them to choose Gt according to equation (4), exactly as
before. A similar argument holds for government investment; while its level in general will not
be eﬃcient, it will not change with d.
92.2 Eﬃciency Wedge
Given a level of public capital Γt, we measure departures from eﬃciency by a wedge τ deﬁned
as follows:
τ =
v (Γt) − v (Γ∗)
v (Γ∗)
.
Here, τ measures the percentage deviation of the value of the marginal public investment project
from what it would be in the eﬃcient allocation. As an example, if τ = 30 percent, it means
that the government will only undertake projects whose beneﬁts exceed $1.30 per $1 of cost.17
Hence, positive (negative) values of τ indicate underprovision (overprovision) of public capital.
As discussed in Bassetto with Sargent [5], we choose this measure because it is particularly robust
to changes in assumptions on the preferences, and it does not require us to take a stand on the
speciﬁc form of the utility function v.
3 Data
We set one period in the model to be one year, in line with the budgeting cycle of all the countries
considered here. The model has two parameters that we set the same for all countries:
• The agents’ discount factor. We set β to the most commonly used number of 0.96, which
yields a yearly discount factor of approximately 4 percent.
• The depreciation rate of capital (δ). We use two values; we set it at 6 percent in line with
commonly used estimates of the depreciation of private capital (we call this case “generic
capital”), and we also experiment with the lower depreciation rate of 3 percent to capture
investment in major infrastructure.
For each country18, we need four additional inputs:
1. The population growth rate.
17The cost is measured netting out the undepreciated value left for the subsequent period.
18We consider the 12 countries that were part of the eurozone as of 2006.
102. The distribution by age of the population.
3. The mortality rate by age.
4. The gross mobility out of the country by age, that is, the probability that a person of a
given age will emigrate to a diﬀerent country within the next year.
A slight complication lies in the distinction between a country’s taxpayers and its citizens.
The growth rate of the population matters for tax receipts, and is thus related to taxpayers
(a population that would include noncitizens), while the other variables enter into the model
because they aﬀect the distribution of voters (only citizens).
Our baseline calibration is based on Eurostat data. Unfortunately, we do not have data on
the number of citizens and the number of emigrant citizens by age for the same year. We thus
rely on data for the total population of the country. This is not a quantitatively important
issue.19 As pointed out by Eurostat [23], “frontier and immigration controls are often minimal
or non-existent for persons leaving a country, and there is a tendency for persons to remain
recorded in administrative systems even after they have left the country.”20 It is thus likely
that these data are somewhat underestimated, which is why we use an alternative source for
a robustness check. Our emigration rates are signiﬁcantly higher than those reported by the
European Commission ([11], annex II), which states that only 0.1 percent of the EU population
moves from one country to another in any given year,21 this further reassures us that we are not
relying on grossly understated emigration rates.
19We use the average annual population growth rate between 1995 and 2005. We use the latest available year
for emigration rates: this is 2005, except for Belgium (1999) and Italy (2003). The population distribution by
age is for the same year. We do not have data for four of the countries. We use piecewise linear interpolation of
ﬁve-year aggregated migration numbers to obtain the emigration rate for each year of age. We thank Anna L¨ o¨ of
for assistance in getting more updated data than those in Eurostat [23]; this also allowed us to include Germany
and Spain. All of these statistics are computed on the population aged 18–90.
20If immigration data were reliably estimated, we could use data about changes in population combined with
data on deaths and immigration to infer emigration. However, this procedure yields negative numbers in several
cases, presumably because immigration is underestimated as well.
21Mart´ ıa n dR ´ odenas [17] discuss why this number is severely underestimated.
11To check for robustness, we use the 2005 Eurobarometer survey (Papacostas [20]) as an
alternative. The survey covers a representative sample of EU residents aged 15 and above. One
of the questions in the survey asks whether the interviewee is likely to move to a diﬀerent country
within the next ﬁve years.22 The survey also contains information about citizenship, so we can
restrict our sample to citizens residing in their home country. To strive for an upper bound,
we assume that anyone that answers yes will move, even though some express intent to move
both within the country and abroad; we attribute one ﬁfth of this fraction to mobility in each
given year (to account for the ﬁve-year window). This measure yields larger numbers for most
countries.23
Table 1 presents summary statistics about population growth and mobility rates (averaged
across all age groups). For comparison with Bassetto with Sargent [5], we also include some U.S.
data. This table shows that emigration rates from European countries are higher than those
for the whole of the United States, but much lower than they are for individual U.S. states.
Population growth tends also to be lower in Europe.24
4 Numerical results
Table 2 includes our numerical results for the baseline calibration. We also include the values
that apply to the U.S. federal government, to the median of the U.S. states, and to the state of
Illinois.25
22Speciﬁcally, the question asks: “Do you think that in the next ﬁve years you are likely to move...?” The
possible answers are: 1. In the same city/town/village; 2. To another city/town/village but in the same region;
3. To another region but in the same country; 4. To another country in the European Union; 5. To another
country outside the European Union; 6. You don’t think you will move; 7. Don’t know. Interviewees are allowed
multiple responses, and we sum up all people that include options 4 or 5, according to their population weights.
23A notable exception is Luxembourg, where the discrepancy between citizens and other nationals plays an
important role.
24U.S. data are from the 2000 U.S. Census; for details, see Bassetto with Sargent [5].
25Details of the calibration are contained in Bassetto with Sargent [5]. Note that the federal data used do not
take into account emigration from the U.S., so that the magnitude of the distortions is very slightly understated
(emigration from the U.S. is exceedingly small).
12Population growth rate Emigration rate (percent)
(percent) (baseline) (Eurobarometer)
Austria 0.5 0.9 0.5
Belgium 0.4 0.4 0.7
Finland 0.5 0.2 1.0
France 0.7 n/a 1.0
Germany 0.3 0.8 0.5
Greece 1.0 n/a 0.6
Ireland 2.1 n/a 1.5
Italy 0.4 0.1 0.6
Luxembourg 1.1 2.6 0.7
Netherlands 0.5 0.5 0.9
Portugal 0.9 n/a 0.8
Spain 1.4 0.2 0.5
Median of the countries above 0.6 0.5 0.7
Median U.S state 1.0 2.1
USA 1.2 0.1
Illinois 0.8 2.0
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
First, we consider what happens under a strict interpretation of the SGP, which does not
allow exclusion of public investment. With the exception of Luxembourg, the magnitude of the
distortion is limited. In the worst-case scenario, the predicted beneﬁt of the marginal public
investment in Austria and Spain is $1.24 for $1 in costs. Comparing the magnitude of the
predicted wedge across countries, we conﬁrm that it is bigger for countries with higher population
growth (such as Spain) or higher emigration rates (Luxembourg and Austria), whereas it looks
particularly small for Italy, a country with very low population growth and mobility. Most of the
variation across countries is driven by aggregate forces that shift up and down the incentives of all
13Country SGP, no exclusions Excluding gross investment Excluding net investment
Generic capital
Austria 16 -24 -1.8
Belgium 11 -22 -1.2
Finland 10 -22 -1.1
Germany 14 -23 -1.5
Italy 6 -20 -0.7
Luxembourg 35 -34 -3.8
Netherlands 13 -22 -1.4
Spain 16 -25 -1.7
Median of the above 14 -22 -1.5
Median U.S state 33 -32 -3.5
USA 14 -24 -1.5
Illinois 30 -30 -3.2
Major infrastructure
Austria 24 -17 -1.8
Belgium 16 -16 -1.2
Finland 15 -16 -1.1
Germany 21 -16 -1.5
Italy 9 -14 -0.7
Luxembourg 51 -25 -3.8
Netherlands 19 -16 -1.4
Spain 24 -18 -1.7
Median of the above 20 -16 -1.5
Median U.S state 48 -24 -3.5
USA 20 -18 -1.5
Illinois 43 -22 -3.2
Table 2: Eﬃciency wedge τ in the baseline calibration (percent)
14generations at the same time; a much less prominent role is played by diﬀerences in the nature of
the conﬂict within generations, stemming from a diﬀerent age structure or a diﬀerential mobility
by age. The eﬃciency wedges are somewhat similar to those predicted for the U.S. federal
government. The similarity comes from two forces that roughly compensate each other. First,
lower population growth in Europe relative to the U.S. decreases the distortion that is coming
from the anticipation of lower future per capita taxes with higher population growth. Second,
small but nonetheless somewhat higher emigration from the European countries than from the
U.S. increases the wedge, as voters discount the future more heavily. The table also shows that
the magnitude of distortions is much bigger in the case of individual U.S. states. This happens
because the migration across U.S. states is signiﬁcantly higher than across European countries.
The case for treating public investment diﬀerently is thus much stronger at the U.S. state level
(where this is standard practice) than at the European national level.
A second important observation arises from looking at the eﬀect of excluding gross investment
from the computation of the deﬁcit. The distortions in this case are mostly as large as or larger
than those in the original interpretation of the SGP, albeit in the opposite direction: countries
are encouraged to signiﬁcantly overspend, particularly when borrowing is allowed for investments
that are not as long-lived, such as equipment. This result stands in stark contrast to Bassetto
with Sargent [5], who ﬁnd that the golden rule achieves a desirable allocation. The key diﬀerence
is the repayment schedule of debt. In Bassetto with Sargent [5], states are required to repay a
fraction of the debt each period. This is meant to capture the practice of U.S. states, where
debt issued to pay for capital improvements is gradually repaid and not rolled over indeﬁnitely.
The SGP does not contain a provision that ensures such gradual repayment; from equation (7),
we see that the government is only raising taxes to repay interest on its past debt and it is
rolling over the principal.26 This strategy moves costs too far into the future compared with the
dates at which the bulk of the beneﬁts of investment will be reaped; hence, current generations
will be tempted to overspend. One possible solution is to set x<1, that is, to allow only a
26The SGP also contains a separate provision stating that the debt-to-GDP ratio of a country should be below
60 percent or moving towards that goal. This provision is weakly enforced, and it would also not be suﬃcient to
generate the repayment schedule that is needed for distortions to vanish.
15portion of investment to be excluded from the deﬁcit computation. Alternatively, excluding net
investment from the deﬁcit subject to the ceiling performs really well. Table 2 shows that the
value of the marginal investment is very close to eﬃciency in this case, supporting Blanchard
and Giavazzi’s [7] recommendation.
Excluding net investment forces a faster repayment of debt, and brings closer costs and
beneﬁts for most generations alive. To see why, consider what happens if people vote to raise
public investment by 1 in period t. Whether gross or net investment is excluded, government
debt Bt increases by 1. In the Markov equilibrium, the eﬀect of the extra investment is reversed
in period t+1, which implies that gross investment drops by (1−δ)/(1+n) and net investment
drops by 1/(1 + n). When gross investment is excluded, substituting this pattern into equation
(3) results in an extra amount of government debt in period t +1g i v e nb yδ/(1 + n) > 0; the
additional debt subsequently decays at the (very slow) rate 1/(1 + n). When net investment is
excluded, all of the additional debt is repaid in period t+1, andBt+1 is unaﬀected. Simple algebra
shows that in this case the wedge is given by −(1−median(θs)/(1+n)), which is independent of
the depreciation rate of capital and is close to 0 for the relevant processes for mortality, mobility,
and population growth.
In practice, excluding net investment is signiﬁcantly more complicated than excluding gross
investment, since it requires knowledge of the appropriate depreciation rate of public capital.
Each additional complication generates new opportunities for governments to game the account-
ing,27 and such a complication is only justiﬁed when the magnitude of the distortions involved
is suﬃciently large.
Figure 1 picks Germany as an example to illustrate how the political decision emerges from
the conﬂict across diﬀerent generations alive in the case of generic capital. The ﬁgure plots
the wedge τ that would be preferred by each cohort; a larger (more positive) τ means that the
cohort favors more severe underinvestment, whereas a more negative τ implies that the cohort
favors more severe overinvestment. We can see that all people alive are unanimous in supporting
underinvestment if no exclusion is allowed (x = 0) and overinvestment when gross investment
27See also the discussion in Balassone and Franco [1].
16Country SGP, no exclusions Excluding gross investment Excluding net investment
Generic capital
Austria 12 -22 -1.3
Belgium 14 -23 -1.6
Finland 21 -24 -2.2
France 17 -25 -1.9
Germany 14 -22 -1.5
Greece 19 -24 -2.1
Ireland 34 -32 -3.6
Italy 13 -23 -1.4
Luxembourg 19 -25 -2.1
Netherlands 18 -24 -1.9
Portugal 21 -26 -2.3
Spain 21 -25 -2.3
Major infrastructure
Austria 17 -16 -1.3
Belgium 21 -17 -1.6
Finland 30 -18 -2.2
France 25 -18 -1.9
Germany 21 -16 -1.5
Greece 28 -18 -2.1
Ireland 49 -24 -3.6
Italy 20 -16 -1.4
Luxembourg 28 -18 -2.1
Netherlands 26 -18 -1.9
Portugal 31 -19 -2.3
Spain 31 -18 -2.3
Table 3: Eﬃciency wedge τ in the Eurobarometer calibration (percent)
17is excluded from the deﬁcit ceiling. When net investment is excluded, most generations favor
an allocation that is extremely close to eﬃcient. In two of the three cases, the vote pits the
young and old against the middle-aged, as we remarked earlier. In the case of excluding gross
investment, the prospect of pushing taxes further into the future becomes particularly relevant,
and a diﬀerent split emerges, with the young on the patient side against the old on the impatient
side.
Table 3 shows the results when emigration is calibrated to the intentions revealed in the Eu-
robarometer survey.28 For the large countries with low population growth and mobility, notably
Germany and Italy, the results are similar to those of the baseline calibration; the distortion
arising from treating government consumption and investment in the same way (that is, no
exclusions) is not very large, albeit not entirely trivial.
5 Conclusion
Two main conclusions stand out from the analysis we carried out.
• The demographics and mobility rates for European countries do not justify drawing a sharp
distinction between the ﬁnancing of government consumption and investment in the same
way those factors for the U.S. states do.
• To the extent that a distinction is approved, it is important to exclude only net investment
from the deﬁcit count, since excluding gross investment could actually worsen distortions.
We analyzed the eﬃciency implications of the SGP from the perspective of an individual coun-
try. For this article, it does not matter whether the deﬁcit restrictions follow from a multilateral
agreement, such as the SGP, or are self-imposed by the constitutions of individual entities, as is
the case for U.S. states. Many authors have discussed the externalities that justify the adoption
of a multilateral pact that covers ﬁscal policy in a monetary union; among them are Beetsma
and Uhlig [6], Dixit and Lambertini [12], Chari and Kehoe [10], and Lindbeck and Niepelt [15].
28For the countries for which we had no Eurostat data on emigration rates, we use the population structure by
age as of 2005, except for France (2004).
18Their insights provide conditions under which it is desirable to restrict the independence of an
individual government in running its ﬁscal aﬀairs, but they do not bear implications for setting
common or diﬀerent rules for government consumption and investment.
Our model captures some forces that lead voters to discount future costs and beneﬁts exces-
sively, but does not entertain the possibility that elected politicians may act as if they were even
more short-sighted than voters. Some of these alternatives are brieﬂy discussed in Bassetto with
Sargent [5]; while it is easy to generate reasons why the current government might be tempted
to overspend if deﬁcit restrictions are not imposed, it is harder to devise environments where
overspending would aﬀect public consumption more than investment, at least without appealing
to myopic behavior on the part of the voters.
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Figure 1: Preferred eﬃciency wedge by age, Germany, generic capital, baseline scenario.
20A Appendix
In this appendix we deﬁne the equilibrium concepts that we use, and we construct a Markov
political-economic equilibrium;29 we then provide an expression for the eﬃciency wedge for public
capital (τ)w h e nnet investment is excluded from the government deﬁcit constraint (for gross
investment, the expression is in Bassetto with Sargent [5], equations (22) and (24) with α =0 ) .
A.1 Competitive Equilibrium
















subject to the budget constraints




and bN,N+t ≥ 0, taking as given the tax sequence {Ts}
N+t
s=t , interest rates {rs}
N+t−1
s=t , and the initial
condition b−1,t−1 = 0. The budget constraints embody an insurance agreement in which assets
of the households that die are redistributed to alive households of the same age in proportion
to their asset holdings. Households that are born in period t<0 solve a similar maximization
problem from date zero, taking as given an exogenous initial condition (1 + r−1)b−t−1,t−1.
A competitive equilibrium is a real allocation {{ˆ cs,t}N
s=0, ˆ γt, ˆ Gt, ˆ Γt}∞




t=0, a tax-debt policy {ˆ Tt, ˆ Bt}∞
t=0, an interest rate sequence {ˆ rt}∞
t=0, and initial con-
ditions {Γ−1,B −1,{b−s−1,−1}
−1
s=−N,r −1} such that:
(i) given the interest rates, the tax policy, the initial conditions, and the transfers, the private
consumption and asset allocation are optimally chosen by the households;
29These deﬁnitions are very similar to those in Bassetto with Sargent [5], except that we use here one-period debt
that is rolled over rather than consols that are repurchased. The results are independent of the debt instrument
as long as the rates at which debt is rolled over or repurchased match (e.g., full roll-over of principal is equivalent
to no repurchases of consols; immediate repurchases are equivalent to no roll-over of short-term debt).
21(ii) at any time t, the real allocation satisﬁes the feasibility conditions (1) with ˆ Ct =
N
s=0 λsˆ cs,t,
where λs is the fraction of households of age s,a n dˆ Γt = 1−δ
1+nˆ Γt−1 +ˆ γt;




λsˆ bs,t;( A . 3 )
(iv) the government budget constraint (2) holds.
The necessary conditions of the household maximization problem imply that in a competitive
equilibrium ˆ rt =( 1− β)/β for t ≥ 0,31 so the interest rate is constant (as written in the main
text).
A.2 Political-Economic Equilibrium
We deﬁne a political-economic equilibrium in which households collectively choose public spend-
ing and investment in each period. To evaluate those choices, households must form expectations
about the evolution of the economy. A history of the economy is a sequence ht ≡{ Gj,Γj}t
j=0, for
any t ≥ 0. We deﬁne a political-economic equilibrium in terms of a mapping Ψ that associates
to each history ht at i m e - t allocation (other than public spending and capital, which are already
included in ht)( {cs(ht)}N
s=0,γ(ht)), a time-t tax-debt policy (B(ht),T(ht)), a time-t asset alloca-
tion {bs(ht)}
N−1
s=0 ,a n dat i m e - t+1 choice of government consumption and capital (G(ht),Γ(ht)).
To obtain the time-0 values of government consumption and capital, we associate two values
G(∅)a n dΓ ( ∅) with the null history. Given any history hj, each mapping Ψ recursively generates
a history from hj as ht =( ht−1,G(ht−1),Γ(ht−1)). Each mapping Ψ and its associated history
induce an allocation and a tax-debt policy from initial conditions Γj−1 and {bs(hj−1)}
N−1
s=0 .32
A political-economic equilibrium is a mapping ˜ Ψ ≡ ({˜ cs}N
s=0,{˜ bs}
N−1
s=0 , ˜ γ, ˜ B, ˜ T)t h a th a st h e
following properties:
30In addition, the initial condition must be consistent, so B−1 =
N
s=0 λsbs,−1.
31We normalize r−1 to the same value.
32hj−1 is the predecessor of the history hj. When we consider an initial history h0, bs(h−1)i sbs,−1, the initial
level that is exogenously given; the same applies to other variables.
22(i) (Competitive equilibrium) Given any history hj, including the null history, the real and asset
allocations and the tax-debt policy induced by ˜ Ψ form a competitive equilibrium from the
initial conditions (Γj−1, ˜ B(hj−1),{˜ bs(hj−1)}
N−1
s=0 ), together with the constant interest rate
r =( 1− β)/β.
(ii) (Self-interested voting) Given any history hj−1, including the null, ( ˜ G(hj−1), ˜ Γ(hj−1)) is a
Condorcet winner over any alternative proposal (G,Γ), assuming that in the future the
economy will follow the path implied by ˜ Ψ. That is, given any alternative (G,Γ), the




































































































Here ˜ hj+t is the history induced by ˜ Ψf r o mhj−1; ˜ h
j+t
G,Γ is the history induced by choosing
(G,Γ) in period j and following ˜ Ψ afterwards.





+ Gt +( 1− x)˜ γ(h
















23where Gt and Γt−1 are the appropriate elements of the history ht. Whether (A.5) or (A.6)
applies depends on whether gross or net investment is excluded according to the rule.
Notice that we impose that taxes are chosen so that the deﬁcit limit binds. This is without
loss of generality for the equilibria and parameter values we are interested in (households
alive would anyway vote for lowering taxes as much as possible), and it greatly simpliﬁes
notation.33
A.3 Markov equilibria
We deﬁne a Markov equilibrium as one where G and Γ are independent of past variables. As
proven in Bassetto with Sargent [5], Markov equilibria exist, and they all share the same level of
Gt,Γ t, and welfare for all generations (for given parameters d, x). For the case in which gross
investment is excluded from the deﬁcit count, Markov equilibrium allocations are constructed
in Bassetto with Sargent [5].34 The construction in the case of net investment is essentially
identical; we present here only the crucial step of determining government investment, referring
to the appendix of Bassetto with Sargent [5] for the rest.
Within the equilibrium, an increase in the time-t provision of public capital will be reversed
in period t + 1. The marginal value of the extra provision is v (Γt). On the cost side, equations
(2) and (A.6) imply that an additional unit γt increases time-t taxes by 1 − x units and leads
t oar e d u c t i o ni nγt+1 of (1 − δΓ)/(1 + n) units, but has no further eﬀect on public investment.




x − (1 − δ)
1+n
where the ﬁrst component is due to higher debt Bt, and the second component results from the
decrease in net investment that occurs in period t + 1. Unlike in the case of gross investment,
33When debt principal can be rolled over, as in the SGP rule, n>0 is a suﬃcient condition for all households
alive to support the highest possible deﬁcit in each period in a Markov equilibrium, even when an independent
choice over taxes is allowed.
34The SGP restriction allows the government to roll over debt, paying only interest. The appropriate value of
α to apply in Bassetto with Sargent’s equations is thus 0.
24when net investment is excluded the adjustments to taxes in periods t and t +1l e a v ed e b ta t
the end of period t + 1 unaﬀected. Hence, no further adjustment occurs after period t +1 .
To a person of age s, the expected present value of taxes per unit of public investment is
therefore











The indirect utility function over government expenditure policy for this person is
v(Γ) − QsΓ. (A.8)
The equilibrium value of Γ is such that v (Γ) = median(Qs).35
Substituting for the interest rate, the equilibrium eﬃciency wedge can be computed as:
τ =
median(Qs) − (1 − β(1 − δ))
1 − β(1 − δ)
= −
x − β(1 − δ)
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